TUTORIAL
SYSTEM SAFETY PROCESS MAPPING

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Risk Analysis and Safety Performance Measurements in Aviation
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System Safety

Purpose and Scope

- Map your in-place safety programs to the System Safety Process (SSP) model

- Identify how you can make improvements

- Recognize why all of the steps of the SSP model are not part of your process

Hazard versus Risk

- Hazard: A condition, event, or circumstance that could lead to or contribute to an unplanned or undesired event.

- Risk: An expression of the impact of an undesired event in terms of event severity and event likelihood.

FAA Order 8040.4, Safety Risk Management
http://www.asy.faa.gov/Risk/Policy/Order8040-4.pdf

Why a Movement towards an FAA System Safety Process

- Traditional surveillance focussed on regulatory compliance.

- Successful in identifying problems to be fixed.

- Problems reflect deeper, systemic safety issues.

- Treating symptoms Vs. treating problems.
  - *»Reactive Vs. Proactive*

System Safety Commonalties in FAA

The following key factors are common to FAA's approach to Safety Risk Assessment.

- Mil-Std 882 / FAA AC 25.1309-1A
- Risk Ranking Matrix
- Identification of Existing Controls
- Accurate Data Reporting
- Understanding organization culture
- Communicating risks to the public

An FAA Standard Risk Management Process

- Document the System Safety approach
- Identify hazards
- Assess safety-related risk
- Identify risk mitigation measures.
- Reduce safety-related risk to an acceptable level.
- Verify and validate risk mitigation.
- Review hazards & acceptance of residual risk.
- Hazard tracking, their closures and residual risk.

System Safety Process


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Define Objectives
        ↓
System Descriptions
        ↓
Hazard Identification: Identify Hazards and Consequences
        ↓
Risk Analysis: Analyze Hazards and Identify Risks
        ↓
Risk Assessment: Consolidate and Prioritize Risks
        ↓
Decision-Making: Develop an Action Plan
        ↓
Validation of Control: Evaluate Results for Further Action → Modify System/Process
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Documentation

System/Process Review

Managing Risk

Managing Risk

How Do We Get To a System Safety Process?

- Understand where our safety programs have been

- Identify where they may be today

- See where we want them to go

- Know what we need to do to improve them

Mapping Your Safety Programs

- Understand the steps of the System Safety Process Model

- Map your in-place safety program processes to the model

- Identify how you can make improvements

- Recognize why all of the steps are not part of your process

Mapping Exercises

- *Purpose*: show how a carrier's multiple safety programs may already contribute to a level of safety and how those programs may benefit from a ***disciplined*** system safety/risk mgmt approach.

    – If steps of the system safety process are not identified within ***their*** processes, the carrier should, at a minimum, understand why not?

➢ ***Note*** *: its not uncommon to discover that three steps of the model: risk analysis, risk assessment, and validation / feedback, are missing.*

SYSTEM SAFETY PROCESS
Mapping Exercise Example

Define Objectives

FAA (CFR, Orders, HBAT)
Corporate Goals

System Descriptions

Safety Manual
Safety Awareness Program

Hazard Identification: Identify Hazards and Consequences

ASRP   Acc/Inc   Ground Safety Program
SDR   Hotlines   Station Action Committees
MIS   Suggestions   IEP FOQA   ASAP
Five-step Hazard Investigation

Risk Analysis: Analyze Hazards and Identify Risks

Risk Assessment: Consolidate and Prioritize Risks

Risk Management

Decision-Making: Develop an Action Plan

Root Cause Analysis

Validation of Control: Evaluate Results for Further Action

Audit Process   Weekly Trend Analysis

Modify System/ Process

Audit Process   Weekly Trend Analysis
Annual Safety Review   Graphs
Safety Committee Meetings

Risk Management

System/Process Review

Documentation

Safety Committee Meetings
Safety Action Group
Corporate Goals
Annual Safety Review
Audits

Safety Program Files
Reports
Databases
Audit Files

11

Hazard Control
(Fly-Fix-Fly)

Documentation

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│              Hazard                  │
│   Identification: Identify           │
│   Hazards and Consequences           │
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┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│   Decision-Making: Develop an        │
│              Action Plan             │
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Hazard Identification: Identify Hazards & Consequences

- Potential hazards may be identified from a number of internal and external sources.

- Initially listed on a Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) then grouped by functional equivalence for analysis.

- Also include the consequence (undesired event) resulting from the hazard scenarios.

13

Decision Making: Develop Action Plans

- Generally four options (T.E.A.M.)
  – Transfer
  – Eliminate
  – Accept
  – Mitigate
- Follow the "Safety Order of Precedence":
  – Design for minimum risk
  – Incorporate safety devices
  – Provide warning devices
 – Develop procedures and training

Hazard Control
(Fly-Fix-Fly)

↑ Documentation →

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│          Hazard             │
│  Identification: Identify   │
│  Hazards and Consequences   │
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┌─────────────────────────────┐
│  Decision-Making: Develop an│
│         Action Plan         │
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Hazard Control Management

Documentation

Hazard Identification: Identify Hazards and Consequences

Decision-Making: Develop an Action Plan

Validation of Control: Evaluate Results for Further Action

Modify System/ Process

16

Validations and Control: Evaluate Results of Action Plan for Further Action

Validation and Verification

Is this still a hazard?

- Has the control been implemented?

- Is the control having its intended effect?
  - If "Yes", then document and continue to monitor
  - If "No", then choose a different control
  - Were any new hazards introduced?

Modify System/Process (If needed)

If the mitigating action does not produce the intended effect, you must determine WHY.

- Are you addressing the wrong hazard?
- Did you introduce a new hazard?

In either case, one would then re-enter the system safety process at the hazard identification step.

Hazard Control Management

Documentation

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                    │            Hazard           │
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         │          │   Hazards and Consequences  │          │
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         │          │         Action Plan         │          │
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                    │ Evaluate Results for        │  │   System/    │
                    │ Further Action              │  │   Process    │
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Risk Management

← Documentation →

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Risk Analysis: Analyze Hazards and Identify Risks

Risk Assessment: Consolidate and Prioritize Risks

Decision-Making: Develop an Action Plan

Validation of Control: Evaluate Results for Further Action

Modify System/Process

Risk Analysis: Analyze Hazards and Identify Risks

- Risk analysis is the process whereby hazards are characterized for their likelihood and severity.

- Risk analysis looks at hazards to determine **what** can happen **when**.

- This can be either a qualitative or quantitative analysis. The inability to quantify and/or the lack of historical data on a particular hazard does not exclude the hazard from the need for analysis.

Risk Assessment: Consolidate & Prioritize Risks

- Process of combining the impacts of risk elements discovered in risk analysis and comparing them against some acceptability criteria.

- Can include the consolidation of risks into risk sets that can be jointly mitigated. The results of this comparison are used in decision making.

Safety: More than the absence of accidents

- Safety is the goal of transforming the severity and likelihood of risk that is inherent in all human activity to lower, acceptable levels.

Patterns In Safety Thinking: A Literature Guide to Air Transportation Safety. McIntyre

RISK ACCEPTABILITY

Likelihood	Severity			
	NEGLIGIBLE	MARGINAL	CRITICAL	CATASTROPHIC
FREQUENT				
PROBABLE				*High*
OCCASIONAL			*Serious*	
REMOTE		*Medium*		
IMPROBABLE	*Low*			

Risk Management

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
System Safety Process

Complete Mapping Exercise

- Don't start from scratch

- Map your safety program processes to the steps in the model

- Identify how to improve your safety program

~ or ~

- Understand why all of the System Safety steps are not part of your process

SYSTEM SAFETY PROCESS
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28

Why Implement System Safety?

- Facilitates an integrated and singular corporate safety program by looking at the whole system.

- Accident rate reduction goal requires a system-wide analytical capability—beyond component failure analysis.

- Provides the means to assess safety related risks. Most incidents/accidents occur at the transition interfaces–human;computer/human;O&M etc.

Safety Benefits

- Industry
  - Controlling costs (Accidents are involuntary and unscheduled expenditures).
  - Conserves resources (If you think safety is expensive, try having an accident).
  - Achieving organizational goals (may lose people, equipment, business and reputation).

Safety Benefits

- Regulator
  - Better risk communication with industry
  - Better use of FAA resources
  - Achieve higher level of safety

Any Questions or Comments?

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